Philosophy of Legal Obligetion.

Abstract

This paper explores the concept of obligation from both philosophical and legal perspectives, considering it as the cornerstone of legal relations, particularly within civil law, where it differs from moral duties by being tied to a legal sanction that ensures its effectiveness. The study traces the historical development of the philosophy of obligation, beginning with natural law, which grounded obligation in reason and justice, and extending to legal positivism, which established obligation on the will of the legislator and the authority of the state.
The research also examines the dialectical relationship between legal and moral obligation, highlighting the influence of moral values on the formulation of legal rules and the resulting points of convergence or divergence between the two. Tort liability is presented as a clear example of this intersection, where law and morality meet in the protection of others from harm.
The significance of this study lies in the scarcity of Arabic research addressing the philosophy of obligation, which grants this paper added value in enriching the Arab legal literature. The paper concludes that the philosophy of obligation is not merely theoretical but rather provides a normative framework that determines the justice of legal rules, while revealing the impact of moral and social dimensions on legal obligation despite its formal independence from them.